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School of Surveillance: The Students’ Rights Implications of Artificial 
Intelligence as K-12 Public School Security* 
Concerns about school safety dominate the nation as school shootings leave parents, 
children, and school officials in constant fear. In response to the violence, some schools 
are acquiring advanced artificial intelligence surveillance technology, including facial 
recognition and geolocation tracking devices, to strengthen security. The companies 
behind these technologies claim they will improve school safety. However, there is little 
indication that they are effective or accurate. Moreover, there is even less information 
regarding the implications to student privacy and the potential negative impact on the 
educational environment. Studies prove facial recognition technologies are biased 
against people of color, which could have devastating effects on students who are already 
at risk of being pushed out of school through the school-to-prison pipeline. This Comment 
focuses on public K-12 schools. It includes a review of the efficacy and accuracy of the 
technologies, analysis of relevant privacy laws, and assessment of the impact on the 
academic environment. It concludes that the many risks associated with introducing 
artificial intelligence surveillance technologies into schools must be evaluated through 
interdisciplinary conversation and should be explored prior to implementation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The publicity around gun violence in schools has increased since the late 
1990s, marked by horrific examples of mass shootings in the halls of K-12 
schools and on college campuses.1 While the exact number of school shootings 
is disputed,2 the impact of school violence is undeniable. A national poll 
 
 1. See, e.g., James Barron, Nation Reels After Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/nyregion/shooting-reported-at-
connecticut-elementary-school.html [https://perma.cc/VZ27-VB7R (dark archive)]; Elizabeth Chuck, 
Alex Johnson & Corky Siemaszko, 17 Killed in Mass Shooting at High School in Parkland, Florida, NBC 
NEWS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/police-respond-shooting-parkland-
florida-high-school-n848101 [https://perma.cc/L7DJ-AVF8]; Christine Hauser & Anahad O’Connor, 
Virginia Tech Shooting Leaves 33 Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/
16/us/16cnd-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/442T-D34Q (dark archive)]; Brittney Martin et al., 
‘Overwhelming Grief’: 8 Students, 2 Teachers Killed in Texas High School Shooting, WASH. POST (May 20, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/05/19/ten-killed-in-texas-high-
school-shooting-were-mostly-students-police-say-suspect-confessed [https://perma.cc/L4JD-YVBG 
(dark archive)]; Mark Obmascik, Columbine High School Shooting Leaves 15 Dead, 28 Hurt, DENVER 
POST (Apr. 21, 1999), http://extras.denverpost.com/news/shot0420a.htm [https://perma.cc/K7KJ-
TE36]. 
 2. As a result of differing definitions and terminology used in data collection and analysis, the 
exact number of school shootings in the United States is unclear. See Saeed Ahmed & Christina Walker, 
There Has Been, on Average, 1 School Shooting Every Week This Year, CNN (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/02/us/school-shootings-2018-list-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/
JWS3-EWQB] (including accidental discharge of a firearm). But see Chris Wilson, This Chart Shows 
the Number of School Shooting Victims Since Sandy Hook, TIME (Feb. 22, 2018), 
http://time.com/5168272/how-many-school-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/4VHE-NSUZ (dark 
archive)] (excluding accidental discharge of a firearm). The United States Department of Education’s 
2015–16 Civil Rights Data Collection report revealed a number of schools had incidents of gun 
violence. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2015–16 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA 
COLLECTION SCHOOL CLIMATE AND SAFETY 2 (May 2019), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
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conducted in 2018 revealed that one-third of parents now fear for their 
children’s physical safety in school, a statistic that reflects a twenty-two percent 
increase since 2013.3 Another survey reported that “[t]wenty percent of parents 
say their child has expressed concern to them about feeling unsafe at their 
school.”4 The March For Our Lives movement,5 started by survivors of the 
2018 mass shooting6 at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School,7 saw an 
estimated 800,000 people turn out for its rally in Washington, D.C., to advocate 
for gun violence prevention legislation.8 In 2018 alone, state legislatures 
considered more than 300 school safety bills and signed over fifty into law.9 
Student safety has also gained considerable traction as a priority within 
the federal government. Citing the Marjory Stoneman Douglas shooting as an 
 
list/ocr/docs/school-climate-and-safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5JL-QBL3] (“Nearly 230 schools (0.2 
percent of all schools) reported at least 1 incident involving a school-related shooting . . . .”). However, 
the accuracy of the study was called into dispute after schools denied that many of the incidents had 
occurred and complaints regarding confusing wording in the questionnaire came to light. See Anya 
Kamenetz, Alexis Arnold & Emily Cardinali, The School Shootings That Weren’t, NPR (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/08/27/640323347/the-school-shootings-that-werent 
[https://perma.cc/V64L-D2DP] (“NPR reached out to every one of those schools repeatedly over the 
course of three months and found that more than two-thirds of these reported incidents never 
happened.”). 
 3. PHI DELTA KAPPAN, THE 50TH ANNUAL PDK POLL OF THE PUBLIC’S ATTITUDES 
TOWARD THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS K9 (2018), http://pdkpoll.org/assets/downloads/pdkpoll50_2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KP8Y-XD5U]; see also Jeffrey M. Jones, More Parents, Children Fearful for Safety at 
School, GALLUP (Aug. 24, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/241625/parents-children-fearful-safety-
school.aspx [https://perma.cc/49FJ-6ZVU] (reporting thirty-five percent of parents “fear for their 
child’s safety at school”). 
 4. Jones, supra note 3. 
 5. MARCH FOR OUR LIVES, https://marchforourlives.com [https://perma.cc/8HJ5-XZ69]. 
 6. The phrase “mass shooting” is not uniformly defined. Emily Alfin Johnson, What Is a Mass 
Shooting? Why We Struggle To Agree on How Many There Were This Year, WAMU (Aug. 4, 2019), 
https://wamu.org/story/19/08/04/what-is-a-mass-shooting-why-we-struggle-to-agree-on-how-many-
there-were-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/MRG8-5E52]; Jason Puckett & David Tregde, VERIFY: 
Claims of Over 250 ‘Mass Shootings’ in 2019 Need Context; Could Be Closer to 30, WUSA9 (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/verify/verify-claims-of-over-250-mass-shootings-in-2019-need-
context-could-be-closer-to-30/507-17aae119-8dd5-40f6-b73a-e083324ed795 [https://perma.cc/RRV4-
S67K]. For the purposes of this Comment, mass shooting refers to shooting incidents in which four or 
more people are injured or killed by a gun. See Johnson, supra; Puckett & Tregde, supra.  
 7. Chuck et al., supra note 1. 
 8. Jessica Durando, March For Our Lives Could Be the Biggest Single-Day Protest in D.C.’s History, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/03/24/march-our-
lives-could-become-biggest-single-day-protest-d-c-nations-history/455675002/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZXQ-ZAZQ]. 
 9. Alexis Arnold, Bills and Bulletproof Backpacks: Safety Measures for a New School Year, NPR (Aug. 
16, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/16/636005341/bills-and-bulletproof-backpacks-safety-
measures-for-a-new-school-year [https://perma.cc/C7E7-BJR6]; see also Heidi Macdonald & Zeke 
Perez, 50-State Comparison: K-12 School Safety, EDUC. COMMISSION STS. (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.ecs.org/50-state-comparison-k-12-school-safety/ [https://perma.cc/7LP3-PZE7] 
(discussing state firearm policies for schools); State Education Policy Tracking, EDUC. COMMISSION 
STS. (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.ecs.org/state-education-policy-tracking/ [https://perma.cc/P94Q-
8Z4M]. 
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impetus,10 President Trump created the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Federal Commission on School Safety11 in March 2018 to study violence in 
schools and provide recommendations for proactive measures at the federal, 
state, and local levels to prevent school violence, mitigate outcomes of violent 
actions, and facilitate efficient responses to violent situations.12 The 
recommendations incorporate “best practices for school building security,” 
including the use of technologies like video surveillance and screening 
systems.13 
In response to the fears of additional school violence and calls for enhanced 
school security, schools have begun tightening security through the use of 
emerging technologies.14 While basic security cameras have been used as 
monitoring devices in schools for years, some schools are looking to more 
advanced technologies to gain a greater level of control over the campus 
environment.15 Recognizing the market opportunity, technology companies are 
developing new devices they claim will prevent or reduce the likelihood of 
school shootings.16 These new devices, which include advanced cameras and 
 
 10. See FED. COMM’N ON SCH. SAFETY, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FINAL REPORT OF THE 
FEDERAL COMMISSION ON SCHOOL SAFETY 5 (Dec. 18, 2018) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], 
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/school-safety-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SWU-
DWL2]. 
 11. The Federal Commission on School Safety was tasked with “providing meaningful and 
actionable recommendations to keep students safe at school.” Federal Commission on School Safety, U.S. 
DEP’T EDUC., https://www.ed.gov/school-safety [https://perma.cc/SC3E-KZGF]. After months of 
listening sessions, field visits, and outreach to stakeholders, id., the Commission released its final report 
in December 2018, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 10.  
 12. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 126–27 (specifically addressing gun violence and building 
security improvements for prevention of violence). 
 13. Id. at 119, 122–23. 
 14. See, e.g., Kaitlyn DeHaven, Texas ISD Makes Major Security Upgrades Over the Summer, 
CAMPUS SECURITY & LIFE SAFETY (Aug. 9, 2019), https://campuslifesecurity.com/articles/2019/
08/09/texas-isd-makes-major-security-upgrades-over-the-summer.aspx [https://perma.cc/3YFR-
TZ47] (“Two apps will now be used as part of the security measures—the Anonymous Alerts app and 
the Smart Button. . . . In terms of physical security, the district installed video intercoms at each school 
entrance.”); Mark Keierleber, Inside the $3 Billion School Security Industry: Companies Marketed 
Sophisticated Technology To ‘Harden’ Campuses, but Will It Make Us Safe?, 74 (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.the74million.org/article/inside-the-3-billion-school-security-industry-companies-
market-sophisticated-technology-to-harden-campuses-but-will-it-make-us-safe/ 
[https://perma.cc/5JY6-HVBE] (“Schools have increasingly locked and monitored campus entrances 
in recent years, though the rise in school security is most evident in the growth of video surveillance.”). 
 15. See Keierleber, supra note 14. 
 16. The media streaming company RealNetworks is offering its facial recognition software to over 
100,000 school districts for free, with the goal of making schools safer. Eli Zimmerman, Company Offers 
Free Facial Recognition Software To Boost School Security, EDTECH (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2018/08/company-offers-free-facial-recognition-software-
boost-school-security [https://perma.cc/4V9N-TMSD]; see also Press Release, SAFR, RealNetworks 
Provides SAFR Facial Recognition Solution for Free to Every K-12 School in the U.S. and Canada 
(July 17, 2018), https://safr.com/press-release/realnetworks-provides-safr-facial-recognition-solution-
for-free-to-every-k-12-school-in-the-u-s-and-canada/ [https://perma.cc/W9LZ-TA65] (“School safety 
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body scanners,17 use biometrics and artificial intelligence (“AI”) to recognize 
faces; detect weapons, gunshots, and other threats; and track individuals’ 
locations in schools.18 For the purposes of addressing school security, the main 
focuses of this Comment are facial recognition, ballistic detection, threat 
assessment, and location tracking, which schools have begun introducing in 
recent years.19 
Despite the purported promise of biometric and AI technologies to protect 
students, these innovations present troubling students’ rights concerns. An 
inherent tension exists between the desire to protect students from violence 
through the installation of biometric and AI technologies and the rights 
students—children—must sacrifice in service of that goal, namely their 
fundamental right to privacy.20 These technologies are intrusive; they involve 
capturing images of children, recording fingerprints, scanning social media, and 
tracking everything from movements to facial expressions.21 This is a significant 
amount of information to be recorded and associated with young people. 
 
has become one of the top national issues in the United States in 2018. . . . We hope this will help make 
schools safer.”); Austin Cushing, What Should Schools Consider Regarding Metal Detectors and X-Ray 
Scanners As Security Measures?, ANCHORTEX CORP. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.anchortex.com/
company/blog/94-what-should-schools-consider-regarding-metal-detectors-and-x-ray-scanners-as-
security-measures [https://perma.cc/D85S-H8PA] (“The National Institute of Justice confirms in its 
project, The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, that walk-
through metal detectors work well at detecting most types of firearms and knives, and can be used as 
part of a school environment.”). 
 17. See sources cited supra note 16. 
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. See infra Part I. For an analysis of the broader array of school surveillance technologies that 
makes up the “surveillance state” in North Carolina, see Barbara Fedders, The Constant and Expanding 
Classroom: Surveillance in K-12 Public Schools, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1673 (2019).  
 20. The tension between security and privacy in the wake of deadly attacks is no new 
phenomenon. After the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, office buildings and airports adopted 
proactive approaches to security to meet the call for risk reduction. See, e.g., Roger Vincent, Office 
Building Security Tightened After 9/11, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/
sep/10/business/la-fi-911-highrise-security-20110910 [https://perma.cc/GA57-V9RN (dark archive)] 
(explaining the increase in office building security in major cities); see also Jason Villemez, 9/11 to Now: 
Ways We Have Changed, PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 14, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/911-
to-now-ways-we-have-changed [https://perma.cc/MH8B-BFVC] (citing the passage of the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act two months after the attacks). These post-9/11 security protocols have 
raised the contentious question of how to balance individual civil liberties with national security. See 
Kathleen Hicks, What Will Americans Do About Their Fear of Terrorism?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/the-state-of-national-security-after-
911/496046/ [https://perma.cc/6D6Z-RCAW (dark archive)] (indicating, in addition, that “[c]urrent 
debates over the best way to balance individual rights with security in the context of government 
surveillance have antecedents in the treatment of anti-war and civil-rights figures during the 1960s and 
1970s”); see also Sahil Chinoy, We Built an ‘Unbelievable’ (but Legal) Facial Recognition Machine, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/16/opinion/facial-recognition-
new-york-city.html [https://perma.cc/SE53-KS5B (dark archive)] (discussing facial recognition 
technology in New York and the lack of state and federal regulation). 
 21. See infra Part I. 
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Students may not understand the extent to which their personal information is 
being collected and shared, and high-level surveillance may alter the nature of 
the educational environment. While schools certainly need to prioritize student 
safety, the degree to which new surveillance technologies compromise student 
privacy is alarming. 
The threat to student privacy is even more concerning given that these 
technologies are in their infancy. There is little evidence that they are effective 
or accurate, and there is even less information regarding the types of risks they 
pose to students and how to mitigate them.22 School districts are investing in 
costly security systems and sharing student data with law enforcement and 
security companies23 all in the name of protecting students, but most of these 
technologies have not been proven to stop school shootings.24 Some critics have 
challenged the accuracy of devices, such as facial recognition scanners, 
particularly when it comes to identification of younger people—the main focus 
in K-12 schools—and people of color, who already experience surveillance and 
law enforcement intrusion at disproportionate rates.25 
 
 22. See Stefanie Coyle & John A. Curr III, Facial Recognition Cameras Do Not Belong in Schools, 
NYCLU (June 18, 2018), https://www.nyclu.org/en/news/facial-recognition-cameras-do-not-belong-
schools [https://perma.cc/BJZ7-ZJXU] (describing the “potential to turn every step a student takes into 
evidence of a crime”); Sarah St. Vincent, Facial Recognition Technology in US Schools Threatens Rights, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 21, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/21/facial-recognition-
technology-us-schools-threatens-rights [https://perma.cc/BJZ7-ZJXU] (explaining that facial 
recognition technology in schools may harm children of color). Additionally, there are added 
complexities for K-12 schools, as opposed to higher education institutions, because the vast majority of 
students are minors.  
 23. See Sara Collins, Tyler Park & Amelia Vance, Ensuring School Safety While Also Protecting 
Privacy, FUTURE PRIVACY F. (June 6, 2018), https://fpf.org/2018/06/06/ensuring-school-safety-while-
also-protecting-privacy-fpf-testimony-before-the-federal-commission-on-school-safety/ 
[https://perma.cc/6VE8-BSKJ] (“Schools are using services such as social media monitoring, digital 
video surveillance linked to law enforcement, and visitor management systems to help protect their 
students.”); Ivan Moreno, AI-Powered Cameras Become New Tool Against Mass Shootings, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/eca5dcff514b49eb8edaaf301d0a3a3d 
[https://perma.cc/7NMG-Q79J]. Lockport City School District in New York faced backlash from 
parents and the New York Civil Liberties Union after investing $3.3 million in a facial recognition 
system. See Thomas J. Prohaska, Lockport Schools Turn to State-of-the-Art Technology To Beef Up Security, 
BUFFALO NEWS (May 20, 2018) [hereinafter Prohaska, Beef Up Security], 
https://buffalonews.com/2018/05/20/lockport-schools-turn-to-state-of-the-art-technology-to-beef-up-
security/ [https://perma.cc/5T6L-ZGV6 (dark archive)]; Thomas J. Prohaska, NYCLU Attacks Lockport 
Schools’ Facial Recognition Security Plan, BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://buffalonews.com/2018/09/03/nyclu-attacks-lockport-schools-facial-recognition-security-plan/ 
[https://perma.cc/5T6L-ZGV6 (dark archive)].  
 24. See Drew Harwell, Unproven Facial-Recognition Companies Target Schools, Promising an End to 
Shootings, WASH. POST (June 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
unproven-facial-recognition-companies-target-schools-promising-an-end-to-shootings/2018/06/07/
1e9e6d52-68db-11e8-9e38-24e693b38637_story.html [https://perma.cc/7DKL-5UJA (dark archive)]. 
 25. See Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016), 
https://slate.com/technology/2016/01/what-the-fbis-surveillance-of-martin-luther-king-says-about-
modern-spying.html [https://perma.cc/DA3W-LNM8] (describing the National Security 
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This Comment addresses key legal issues surrounding advanced security 
technologies in public K-12 schools, including the impact on student privacy 
rights under relevant laws. It also explores the effects these technologies have 
on the educational environment. It argues that, in using AI surveillance 
technology in schools, privacy must be balanced against security concerns; the 
apparent issues with efficacy and accuracy of the technology should be 
addressed before implementation; and Fourth Amendment case law, federal 
student privacy legislation, and state laws need to be further developed, with 
states leading the way, to ensure the protection of students’ rights. The scope 
of the analysis is limited to public schools because these schools are subject to 
more government control than private schools.26  
Part I presents background on AI technologies and an overview of the 
technologies that are currently in use or are in development for school 
surveillance. Part II addresses potential harms to students resulting from AI 
surveillance in schools, including the implications of accuracy and efficacy issues 
in AI algorithms. Part III delves into the application of relevant privacy laws, 
specifically the Fourth Amendment, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (“FERPA”), and state laws, and demonstrates that the law has not 
progressed to the point of effectively protecting students from AI surveillance. 
In the end, this Comment argues that schools and governments have more work 
to do to protect students from technological intrusions that undermine their 
basic rights. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES 
Gone are the days when school security simply meant a parent volunteer 
at the front office, student IDs with outdated photos, or low-quality cameras 
that produced grainy images from afar. Today’s surveillance options are in a 
constant state of technological development, utilizing advanced methods that 
resemble Orwell’s predictions.27 This part begins with an overview of the 
 
Association’s wiretapping of Martin Luther King Jr., surveillance of Japanese Americans during World 
War II, and the monitoring of shops in majority-Muslim neighborhoods post-September 11, 2001). 
 26. See The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/
overview/fed/role.html [https://perma.cc/4C8V-RE69]; Stephanie Watson, How Public Schools Work, 
HOW STUFF WORKS, https://people.howstuffworks.com/public-schools2.htm [https://perma.cc/
AM5P-MYVE]. In comparison to public schools, private schools are subject to less regulation. See 
generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2009) [hereinafter 
STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS], https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/
regprivschl/regprivschl.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FGW-R3UG] (illustrating the minimal regulatory 
requirements for private schools).  
 27. See, e.g., Patrick Law Grp., LLC, When 2017 Becomes 1984: Facial Recognition Technologies—
Face a Growing Legal Landscape, JD SUPRA (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/when-
2017-becomes-1984-facial-79060/ [https://perma.cc/H82U-C6JQ]. Despite some parallels between 
Orwell’s predictions and current technology, most of the surveillance systems depicted in the classic 
dystopian novel 1984 were far more advanced than what is being used in the United States today—as 
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mechanics of biometric and AI technology. It then describes the specific types 
of technologies in use for security in schools. 
Biometric technology is “the automated technique of measuring a physical 
characteristic or personal trait of an individual and comparing that characteristic 
or trait to a database for purposes of recognizing that individual.”28 Biometrics 
may include “fingerprints, DNA, facial recognition, iris and retina scans, vein 
structure, walking gait, and voice recognition.”29 For example, when an 
individual uses her thumbprint to unlock a cellphone, biometric technology is 
used to recognize her specific thumbprint and unlock the phone. 
Artificial intelligence takes biometric data to the next level. AI involves 
machines or technologies completing tasks we typically think of as being 
performed by humans.30 There is no single accepted definition of AI,31 but it 
can be defined through categorizations of what it does or how it works: AI 
engages in perception, natural language processing, logical reasoning, planning 
and navigation, and knowledge representation.32 While there are multiple 
subfields of AI, “machine learning” has garnered a significant amount of 
attention.33 Machine learning is “a branch of artificial intelligence based on the 
idea that systems can learn from data, identify patterns and make decisions with 
 
far as we know. Rob Beschizza, Does the Technology of Orwell’s 1984 Really Exist?, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2008), 
https://www.wired.com/2008/02/does-the-techno/ [https://perma.cc/WW9E-75V9 (dark archive)]. 
 28. John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns—Drafting the 
Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 99 (1997). 
 29. Robee Krishan & Reza Mostafavi, Biometric Technology: Security and Privacy Concerns, J. 
INTERNET L., July 2018, at 19, 19. 
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(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/2018/12/10/artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-of-
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 31. Matt Chessen, What Is Artificial Intelligence? Definitions for Policy-Makers and Non-Technical 
Enthusiasts, MEDIUM (Apr. 3, 2017), https://medium.com/artificial-intelligence-policy-laws-and-
ethics/what-is-artificial-intelligence-definitions-for-policy-makers-and-laymen-826fd3e9da3b 
[https://perma.cc/LG29-S69H]. AI may be defined broadly as “a computerized system that exhibits 
behavior that is commonly thought of as requiring intelligence” or as “a system capable of rationally 
solving complex problems or taking appropriate actions to achieve its goals in whatever real world 
circumstances it encounters.” NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 6 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD9L
-6G56]. 
 32. Frank Chen, AI, Deep Learning, and Machine Learning: A Primer, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ 
(June 10, 2016), https://a16z.com/2016/06/10/ai-deep-learning-machines/ [https://perma.cc/35AT-
FL9S]. 
 33. See, e.g., Louis Columbus, State of AI and Machine Learning in 2019, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2019/09/08/state-of-ai-and-machine-learning-in-
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minimal human intervention.”34 Through a system of algorithms, machine 
learning “enables computers to learn from experience or examples.”35 
When AI is paired with biometrics, like facial recognition cameras or 
fingerprint scanners, the technologies are able to more deeply assess the content 
they are exploring.36 Instead of simply capturing a photographic image or 
copying a thumbprint, the system can run the information through a database, 
look for a match, and then take action, like automatically opening a door.37 In 
the context of security, some companies are embedding their technologies with 
machine learning and biometrics so that, for example, “the system is taught to 
identify an object as a threat based on certain characteristics—such as the 
signature [features] of a gun, knife or bomb.”38 A system is trained by being fed 
numerous images and asked to identify them until the system improves—or 
“learns”—to the point where it identifies images at a high level of accuracy and 
precision.39 
In schools, biometric and AI technologies cover a wide spectrum of 
programs. The AI industry has seen a massive boom within the education 
market, and the worldwide AI education market value is predicted to surpass 
six billion dollars by 2024,40 with classroom applications accounting for twenty 
percent of that growth.41 Much of the reason for this growth is the integration 
 
 34. Machine Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/
analytics/machine-learning.html [https://perma.cc/NVJ3-W8QQ]. 
 35. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH 
& DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN 5 (2016), https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/
national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/F75U-43SY]. Deep learning, a more complex 
branch of AI, has also made waves. See id. at 5 n.4 (describing deep learning as “a general family of 
methods that use multi-layered neural networks”). 
 36. Naveen Joshi, Biometrics Is Smart, but AI Is Smarter. Here’s Why, ALLERIN (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.allerin.com/blog/biometrics-is-smart-but-ai-is-smarter-heres-why 
[https://perma.cc/RN7S-LVKK] (“AI and biometrics can work together to develop effective and 
reliable security models.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Stanley Goodner, Finger Scanners: What They Are and Why They Are Gaining in 
Popularity, LIFEWIRE (June 24, 2019), https://www.lifewire.com/understanding-finger-scanners-
4150464 [https://perma.cc/7R9X-L2MB]; Ronnie Wendt, Facial Recognition Technology Faces Scrutiny, 
SECURITY SALES & INTEGRATION (July 30, 2019), https://www.securitysales.com/news/facial-
recognition-tech-scrutiny/ [https://perma.cc/FK7H-HTUM]. 
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 39. See Danny Sullivan, How Machine Learning Works, as Explained by Google, MARTECH TODAY 
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://martechtoday.com/how-machine-learning-works-150366 [https://perma.cc/
UZQ4-DKXV]; What Is Machine Learning?, MATHWORKS, https://www.mathworks.com/discovery/
machine-learning.html [https://perma.cc/6QB2-9UZ4]. 
 40. Ankita Bhutani & Preeti Wadhwani, Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Education Market Size Worth 
$6bn by 2024, GLOBAL MKT. INSIGHTS (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.gminsights.com/pressrelease/
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of AI systems for personalized learning, which enables students to receive 
“immediate and personalized feedback and instructions . . . without the 
intervention of a human tutor.”42 Biometrics have been incorporated into the 
classroom as well,43 and some schools even use biometrics to allow students to 
pay for lunch with just a fingerprint.44 
Schools are also starting to incorporate AI and biometrics into surveillance 
programs. One popular new area of school surveillance technology is location 
tracking. For instance, the program “e-hallpass” is a modern, electronic hall pass 
that “continuously logs and monitors student time in the halls” and claims to 
“improv[e] school security and emergency management while reducing 
classroom disruptions by as much as 50%.”45 A similar program, “iClicker Reef,” 
tracks attendance through a geolocation feature.46 Using geolocation,47 these 
 
artificial-intelligence-market-set-explode-u-s-worldwide-2024/ [https://perma.cc/6HBQ-JCEF]; see 
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squirrel-has-started-a-grand-experiment-in-ai-education-it-could-reshape-how-the/ 
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learning center in China). 
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[https://perma.cc/J265-VLXM] (describing an online test proctoring system which confirms test-
takers’ identities through fingerprints and voice biometrics). 
 44. Biometrics Allows Students To Purchase with Fingerprint, GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 17, 2007), 
https://www.govtech.com/health/Biometrics-Allows-Students-to-Purchase-with.html 
[https://perma.cc/E8BS-6QJH]. 
 45. E-Hallpass, EDUSPIRE SOLUTIONS, https://www.eduspiresolutions.org/what-is-e-hallpass/ 
[https://perma.cc/7BBP-TY6L]. 
 46. David Rosen & Aaron Santesso, How Students Learned To Stop Worrying—and Love Being Spied 
On, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Students-
Learned-to-Stop/244596 [https://perma.cc/XZW2-YKY8 (dark archive)]. 
 47. Daniel Ionescu, Geolocation 101: How It Works, the Apps, and Your Privacy, ITWORLD (Mar. 
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location systems have the ability to identify when a student is in class, log 
attendance for the teacher, and track where students are in school.48 
Facial recognition is another growing category of biometric and AI 
technology that schools are beginning to use. For example, one private high 
school implemented a facial recognition49 camera program that automatically 
unlocks doors upon recognition of individuals—staff, students, and 
volunteers—whose photographs have been uploaded into the system database.50 
The school can also upload images of “key undesirables,” such as sex offenders 
or disgruntled employees, and the system will notify administrators if those 
individuals are seen by the cameras.51 
Another type of facial recognition program, called “affect recognition,” 
uses biometric analysis to scan individuals’ faces and identify emotions.52 For 
instance, an Australian university is currently testing a product called the 
“Biometric Mirror,” which reads faces and ranks them according to fourteen 
characteristics, including gender, age, ethnicity, attractiveness, “weirdness,” and 
emotional stability.53 Schools in China have implemented a similar technology 
to analyze students’ facial expressions, including expressions like “neutral, 
happy, sad, disappointed, angry, scared and surprised.”54 The main goal of this 
 
 48. Rosen & Santesso, supra note 46. Some schools are extending their monitoring programs off 
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 49. See Facial Recognition, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/32071/facial-
recognition [https://perma.cc/AMB3-8VLK] (“Facial recognition is a biometric software application 
capable of uniquely identifying or verifying a person by comparing and analyzing patterns based on 
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in Education? Is This Involvement Just?, CTR. FOR PUB. JUST., https://www.cpjustice.org/public/
page/content/cie_faq_levels_of_government [https://perma.cc/EB7K-A378] (“Independent schools, 
which are established by associations, parents or individuals, operate independent of direct government 
control.”). 
 51. Counter, supra note 50. 
 52. MEREDITH WHITTAKER ET AL., AI NOW REPORT 2018, at 4 (Dec. 2018), 
https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EAJ-AALT] (“Affect 
recognition is a subclass of facial recognition that claims to detect things such as personality, inner 
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AUSTL. (July 23, 2018), https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/how-ai-is-using-facial-
recognition-to-decipher-your-personality/10025634 [https://perma.cc/9VGY-5L5X]. 
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so-called “smart eye” is to alert teachers when students are distracted in class.55 
However, the identification of changes in mood may also assist educators with 
identifying students experiencing mental health crises, which could help flag 
potential threats.56  
The use of technology to analyze student behavior extends beyond the 
physical classroom. Some schools are already monitoring their students online, 
using Safety Management Platforms as threat assessment measures to scan 
school computers for indicators of violence by analyzing the words students 
type.57 Threat assessment programs aim to “evaluate the risk posed by a student 
or another person, typically as a response to an actual or perceived threat or 
concerning behavior.”58 
A final type of surveillance technology receiving significant attention is 
ballistic detection. For example, one company’s “gunshot defense system” uses 
artificial intelligence to detect gunshots, alert law enforcement, and engage with 
the shooter by “delivering intense, non-lethal sound waves and light beams that 
virtually stops an attacker on the spot, which also creates a diversion to assist 
students and faculty with additional time to run and hide or escape.”59 Cameras 
around the building track the shooter’s location and deliver updates to law 
enforcement while the system uses AI to direct victims to the safest exits.60 The 
program’s developer markets the technology with a video stating that “[t]he 
majority of the deaths and casualties [in a mass shooting] happen within the 
first 5 minutes or 300 seconds,”61 making it imperative to identify and stop a 
shooter quickly. This type of technology is extremely appealing as it acts as a 
first line of defense and assists responding law enforcement officers. Other 
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 56. See, e.g., Randy Rieland, Can Artificial Intelligence Help Stop School Shootings?, SMITHSONIAN 
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school-shootings-180969288/ [https://perma.cc/7VRZ-2T6Y] (describing the use of machine learning 
to analyze student language and behavior and help counselors with risk assessment). 
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QUARTZ (Aug. 19, 2018), https://qz.com/1318758/schools-are-using-ai-to-track-what-students-write-
on-their-computers/ [https://perma.cc/X9B2-LEHB]. 
 58. Threat Assessment, OFF. SUPERINTENDENT PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://www.k12.wa.us/
student-success/health-safety/school-safety-center/z-index/threat-assessment [https://perma.cc/
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school-climate-safety-and-crisis/systems-level-prevention/threat-assessment-at-school/threat-
assessment-for-school-administrators-and-crisis-teams [https://perma.cc/KVV7-GMNY] (“The goals 
of threat assessment are to keep schools safe and to help potential offenders overcome the underlying 
sources of their anger, hopelessness, or despair.”). 
 59. 300 Seconds Video—School Security Solutions, SECURITY ORACLE, 
https://www.thesecurityoracle.com/system-products/school-security-solution 
[https://perma.cc/4R8G-5LW9]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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companies that use ballistic detection, but different methods of response, have 
also entered the K-12 market.62  
Although the technology may sound positive from a security standpoint, 
these technologies are intrusive and create an environment where students are 
tracked, monitored, and watched. Many of these programs involve constant 
monitoring of children, and some collect personally identifying data, including 
fingerprints and face images. As will be discussed in Parts II and III, there are 
a number of potential adverse consequences of these technologies: students may 
be less likely to speak openly in class, risks of false data matches may lead to 
wrongful disciplinary actions, and the technologies encroach on student privacy 
rights.  
II.  EFFICACY AND ACCURACY PROBLEMS WITH AI SURVEILLANCE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
The use of AI surveillance technologies in schools has the potential to alter 
the academic environment, in large part because the unknown inner workings 
of the technologies result in problems with accuracy and efficacy. This part 
addresses the impact of surveillance on students’ freedom in the educational 
setting, which is compounded by the lack of transparency of AI technology 
developers. The lack of transparency makes it difficult to fully predict the extent 
of potential issues with the technologies, such as bias in the algorithms that 
could result in harm to students and their parents. Instead of providing a safer 
environment, these developments come at the expense of safety, especially 
given that the efficacy of the technologies in preventing school violence has not 
been proven. 
A. Impact on the Academic Environment 
One example of the impact new surveillance technologies may have on 
students comes in the classroom setting. Students who know they are being 
monitored may not express controversial views, thus suppressing the quality of 
the academic environment. Students may also avoid sharing personal details out 
of fear of disciplinary response by their school. While companies claim their 
surveillance programs are effective in preventing violence, they may also 
normalize a surveillance state or “have a chilling effect on students’ freedom of 
expression.”63  
 
 62. See, e.g., EAGL Gunshot Detection & Lockdown System, EAGL, 
https://www.eagltechnology.com/eagl-gunshot-detection-lockdown-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/DY3W-MYF9]; Firefly & Dragonfly, EAGL, https://www.eagltechnology.com/
firefly-dragonfly/ [https://perma.cc/EZ4M-YBLQ]; LightAway, VS ENERGY, 
https://www.vsenergy.us/lightaway-dynamic-lighting-wayfinding-372034.html 
[https://perma.cc/BY77-EBLN]. 
 63. Stolzoff, supra note 57. 
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In the higher education setting, there is some evidence that students are 
willing to withstand surveillance in exchange for efficiency.64 This is perhaps 
an even stronger example of the negative impact surveillance at an early age can 
create. As students of younger generations have little choice in whether to give 
up information to technology at a young age in K-12 schools, it is not surprising 
that as they enter adulthood they will think less of the consequences and more 
of the benefits.  
B. Lack of Transparency and Understanding 
Beyond the impact on the academic environment, the new technology also 
lacks transparency. Engineers may use AI to train a system to accurately 
identify, for example, a picture of a turtle, but even the engineers may not know 
how the system reaches its conclusion because the technology is so complex. 
This “black box”—“the idea that we can understand what goes in and what 
comes out, but don’t understand what goes on inside”—dramatically reduces 
transparency.65 While it may not be as concerning in a low-stakes situation that 
lends itself to easy independent verifiability (like the turtle identification 
example), misidentification, privacy intrusion, and harms to the educational 
environment are risks of black box AI that will become more evident should 
humans rely on machines for critical decisionmaking that impacts people’s lives 
and abilities to achieve an education.66 Further, AI involves proprietary 
technologies, meaning companies can protect the inner workings of the 
machines as intellectual property.67 This allows companies to maintain secrecy 
around the programs, so even if the engineers do know how a program is 
reaching a conclusion, the company does not have to reveal that information. 
The extent to which information is available regarding the inner workings of AI 
 
 64. Rosen & Santesso, supra note 46. 
 65. Tim Sandle, Crypto, AI and Machine Learning To Shape Enterprises, DIGITAL J. (Jan. 9, 2019), 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/print/article/540595 [https://perma.cc/7KRD-HENR]. 
 66. Some courts have begun using AI for recidivist risk assessment without a full understanding 
of which factors the machines consider, thus raising due process concerns. See Noel L. Hillman, The 
Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, JUDGES’ J. 36, 36–38 (2019); Katherine 
Freeman, Recent Development, Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed To Protect 
Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 75, 75, 104 (2016); Ed Yong, A Popular 
Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes than Random People, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), 
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[https://perma.cc/3Q3Y-2ZV2 (dark archive)]. Similar models employed for credit scoring have 
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Assessing Credit Scores that Humans Did a Century Ago, QUARTZ (May 14, 2018), 
https://qz.com/1276781/algorithms-are-making-the-same-mistakes-assessing-credit-scores-that-
humans-did-a-century-ago/ [https://perma.cc/8NSQ-9VXU]. 
 67. See Jessica M. Meyers, Artificial Intelligence and Trade Secrets, A.B.A. (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/2018-
19/january-february/artificial-intelligence-trade-secrets-webinar [https://perma.cc/8YL5-MXGX]. 
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technologies thus heavily relies on companies’ willingness to voluntarily share 
data, which many companies are hesitant to do.68 
C. Efficacy of AI Surveillance To Prevent or Stop School Shootings 
The lofty promises of AI surveillance companies remain unverified; it is 
not yet certain that these technologies are effective in preventing school 
shootings. For example, while facial recognition companies are marketing their 
products as resources to stop prohibited people from entering campus, most 
school shootings have been committed by students who were permitted to be 
on campus.69 Thus, while the technology may work well in a vacuum,70 the 
application to the types of shootings that occur at K-12 schools lacks indications 
of efficacy.71 
So far, AI has not been proven to be foolproof in even its most basic 
applications, showing that ill-intentioned people could circumvent AI 
surveillance technologies in order to access schools. In fact, AI is even capable 
of tricking AI.72 In test settings, biometric security systems have been 
threatened by AI manipulation.73 In one study, researchers used neural 
networks to create fake fingerprints in an attempt to fool fingerprint-scanning 
systems—and it worked.74 When the fakes tricked the system, it allowed the 
researchers to refine their technology to create even more realistic and effective 
fake prints.75  
 
 68. The National Institute for Standards and Technology offers evaluations of facial recognition 
programs, but the program is voluntary and there is no oversight or enforcement mechanism. Christina 
Couch, Ghosts in the Machine, PBS: NOVA (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/ai-
bias/ [https://perma.cc/4CU8-P8W5]. 
 69. Harwell, supra note 24. Since 1970, there have been 1300 school shootings. The K-12 Shooting 
Statistics Everyone Should Know (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/safety/k-12-
school-shooting-statistics-everyone-should-know/ [https://perma.cc/8NST-5ER6]. Of those, 691 were 
committed by a current student, while fifty-eight were committed by former students. Id. 
 70. The less risk involved, and the fewer people entered into the database, the more effective the 
technology. Face Recognition, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/face-
recognition [https://perma.cc/Q6NS-9ASH]. 
 71. Harwell, supra note 24 (quoting Andrew Ferguson, a law professor at the University of the 
District of Columbia, as saying that “[t]hese companies are taking advantage of the genuine fear and 
almost impotence of parents who want to protect their kids . . . and they’re selling them surveillance 
technology at a cost that will do very little to protect them”). 
 72. Researchers used an AI algorithm to trick Google’s image recognition software into 
identifying a turtle as a rifle “because it identified hidden elements embedded in the image that shared 
certain properties with an image of a gun, all of which were unnoticeable by the human eye.” Jonathan 
Vanian, Artificial Intelligence Is Giving Rise to Fake Fingerprints. Here’s Why You Should Be Worried, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 28, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/11/28/artificial-intelligence-fingerprints-security/ 
[https://perma.cc/DL4T-FRAJ]. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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Fortunately, it takes significant knowledge of the technology to beat it, 
and many fingerprint sensor software companies employ additional security 
measures, like heat sensors, to deter attacks.76 Nonetheless, the fact that AI 
systems can be tricked shows that these technologies must undergo significant 
development before they can compete with humans for even some of the most 
basic uses and certainly before these programs are released for high-level 
security in schools. Humans must work alongside machines to make final 
judgment calls and to catch threats that machines fail to identify.77  
D. Machine Bias 
A major concern related to implementing AI technologies is the risk of 
machine bias, which refers to systematic disparities in accuracies of algorithm 
results, typically with respect to race, but also gender or age.78 The identification 
abilities of AI in biometrics are only as good as the humans who develop them. 
A prominent AI expert and co-founder of AI4ALL79 described the issue as such: 
“bias in, bias out.”80  
There is a severe lack of diversity in the artificial intelligence field.81 One 
major study found that women make up less than twenty percent of AI 
professors, conference authors, and research staff at major technology 
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 78. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
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[https://perma.cc/C8DL-NKTU]; Machine Bias, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/33036/machine-bias [https://perma.cc/QQ4R-6BNC]; Margaret Rouse, Machine Learning 
Bias (Algorithm Bias or AI Bias), SEARCH ENTERPRISE AI, 
https://searchenterpriseai.techtarget.com/definition/machine-learning-bias-algorithm-bias-or-AI-bias 
[https://perma.cc/9WB7-K3NF]. 
 79. AI4ALL is a nonprofit “dedicated to increasing diversity and inclusion in AI education, 
research, development, and policy.” Our Story, AI4ALL, http://ai-4-all.org/about/our-story/ 
[https://perma.cc/4JYX-V3UH]. 
 80. Jessi Hempel, Fei-Fei Li’s Quest To Make AI Better for Humanity, WIRED (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/fei-fei-li-artificial-intelligence-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/8ZZM-
C95W (dark archive)]. 
 81. See SARAH MYERS WEST, MEREDITH WHITTAKER & KATE CRAWFORD, AI NOW INST., 
DISCRIMINATING SYSTEMS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN AI passim (Apr. 2019), 
https://ainowinstitute.org/discriminatingsystems.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH8Y-AE94] (highlighting 
the male domination and lack of people of color in the AI research and development field); see also Kari 
Paul, ‘Disastrous’ Lack of Diversity in AI Industry Perpetuates Bias, Study Finds, GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/16/artificial-intelligence-lack-diversity-new-york-
university-study [https://perma.cc/L8WT-KEG8]; Jonathan Vanian, Eye on A.I.—How To Fix Artificial 
Intelligence’s Diversity Crisis, FORTUNE (Apr. 23, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/04/23/artificial-
intelligence-diversity-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/84AE-9NHD].  
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companies,82 and people of color account for less than ten percent of AI 
engineers at top companies.83 The demographic makeup of employees of these 
companies is reflected in the output of the machines.84 Resulting machine bias 
is, perhaps, reflective of the cultural perceptions and identities of the engineers. 
However, it is difficult to study the potential consequences of machine bias 
when the inner workings of surveillance technologies remain concealed.85 There 
is a void in the law when it comes to protecting students against these bias 
errors. This must be addressed before releasing these largely untested 
technologies on students. 
1.  Machine Bias Generally 
There is limited research on the accuracy of facial recognition algorithms,86 
and the information that does exist indicates disproportionate misidentification 
of Black people, women, and young people.87 False matches, or 
misidentifications, occur when the system matches a scanned face to the wrong 
person in a database.88 For example, individual X may be scanned and matched 
with the profile of fugitive Y. Individual X is then arrested under the 
assumption he or she is actually fugitive Y.  
 
 82. See WEST ET AL., supra note 81, at 10–11 (finding women constitute eighteen percent of 
authors at AI conferences in the field, less than twenty percent of AI professors, and between ten and 
fifteen percent of AI research staff at large tech firms like Facebook and Google). 
 83. See id. at 11 (citing statistics from Google, Facebook, and Microsoft for Black and Latinx 
employees). 
 84. See infra Section II.D.1; see also Angela Benton, An AI-Run World Needs To Better Reflect People 
of Color, WIRED (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/an-ai-run-world-needs-to-better-
reflect-people-of-color/ [https://perma.cc/YP4G-EZCD (dark archive)] (recommending that 
incorporating more women and people of color into developer teams will improve potential machine 
learning algorithms). 
 85. See supra Section II.B. 
 86. One reason for the lack of research is that these programs are mostly used by law enforcement 
and such agencies actively try to keep the inner workings obscure. See Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle, 
Facial-Recognition Software Might Have a Racial Bias Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlying-bias-of-facial-recognition-
systems/476991/ [https://perma.cc/X6X2-RRZF (dark archive)]; Karen Hao, Police Across the U.S. Are 
Training Crime-Predicting AIs on Falsified Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612957/predictive-policing-algorithms-ai-crime-dirty-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZS9X-KCP3 (dark archive)]. Additionally, law enforcement systems “are not 
required to undergo public or independent testing,” and agencies certainly are not volunteering this 
information for evaluation. Garvie & Frankle, supra. 
 87. See, e.g., Angwin et al., supra note 78 (discussing AI racial bias); Couch, supra note 68 (stating 
that three facial recognition algorithms were less accurate when reading the faces of women, Black 
people, and younger people); Garvie & Frankle, supra note 86 (discussing AI racial bias). 
 88. See, e.g., Kate Queram, Face-Recognition Tool Misidentified Lawmakers as Criminals: ACLU, 
DEF. ONE (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/08/face-recognition-tool-
misidentified-state-lawmakers-criminals-aclu/159190/ [https://perma.cc/8CJ9-F8E6]; Tom Simonite, 
The Best Algorithms Struggle To Recognize Black Faces Equally, WIRED (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-struggle-recognize-black-faces-equally/ 
[https://perma.cc/7H8S-J45R (dark archive)]. 
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Misidentification is likely caused by problems with the development and 
training of the software. A study authored by a researcher from the National 
Institute of Standards and Technologies, which tests facial recognition products 
every four years, found that while accuracy rates89 have improved over the years, 
accurate recognition is affected by the racial compositions of an algorithm’s 
development team and the database of test photos.90 This means that, for 
example, algorithms developed in Germany more accurately identify 
Caucasians while algorithms developed in Japan are better at identifying East 
Asians.91 In the melting pot of the United States, however, the algorithms were 
“significantly better at recognizing Caucasian facial characteristics.”92 A 2012 
study of facial recognition algorithms used by U.S. law enforcement “found that 
the algorithms were 5–10% less accurate when reading black faces over white 
ones and showed similar discrepancies when analyzing faces of women and 
younger people,”93 and additional studies have found errors up to thirty-five 
percent of the time for images of darker skin.94 This flaw in facial recognition 
algorithms has the potential to compound existing biases, particularly in light 
of law enforcement’s already disproportionate mistreatment of Black people.95 
Since misidentifications of people of color lead to unnecessary interactions with 
the police, and given the police are more likely to use force on people of color, 
it follows that misidentification could lead to further harm.96 
 
 89. The “accuracy rate” of a facial recognition algorithm is the rate at which the technology 
accurately matches a face image to the database. 
 90. Garvie & Frankle, supra note 86. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Couch, supra note 68.  
 94. Steve Lohr, Facial Identification Is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html 
[https://perma.cc/EY7H-MNDE (dark archive)]. In contrast, identification of White men is accurate 
up to ninety-nine percent of the time. Id. 
 95. See Devon W. Carbado & L. Song Richardson, The Black Police: Policing Our Own, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 1979, 1992–95 (2018) (describing the impact of implicit bias resulting in disproportionate 
mistreatment of Black people in policing, even by Black police officers); Quoctrung Bui & Amanda 
Cox, Surprising New Evidence Shows Bias in Police Use of Force but Not in Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/upshot/surprising-new-evidence-shows-bias-in-police-
use-of-force-but-not-in-shootings.html [https://perma.cc/Z6F6-M7EB (dark archive)] (explaining 
that while one study found no racial bias in police shootings, it did find that police officers are more 
likely to use certain kinds of force against Black men than against other suspects: Black men are “more 
likely to be touched, handcuffed, pushed to the ground or pepper-sprayed by a police officer”); German 
Lopez, There Are Huge Racial Disparities in How US Police Use Force, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938186/police-shootings-killings-racism-racial-
disparities [https://perma.cc/4W38-HHYX] (“Black people accounted for 31 percent of police killings 
in 2012, even though they made up just 13 percent of the US population.”).  
 96. Bui & Cox, supra note 95; see also Kaitlyn Burton, Amazon Investors To Vote on Halting Face 
Recognition Sales, LAW360 (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/1146819/
amazon-investors-to-vote-on-halting-face-recognition-sales [https://perma.cc/6PL8-NQYX (dark 
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2.  Machine Bias in Schools 
In the context of K-12 schools, these biases are even more problematic. 
Students of color are already subjected to disproportionate disciplinary action 
in K-12 schools,97 which ultimately places them at higher risk for entry into the 
criminal justice system via the “school-to-prison pipeline.”98 Inserting a flawed 
surveillance system into the mix could further threaten access to education for 
students of color, ultimately impacting their economic success and physical 
health.99 Further, facial detection readings of women’s faces are often 
inaccurate.100 Currently, “Black girls face high and disproportionate suspension 
rates across the country—and it’s not because they are misbehaving more 
frequently than other girls.”101 Rooted in implicit bias and stereotyping, Black 
girls are held to “lower academic expectations” and “make up disproportionately 
high shares of girls who are retained in every single grade.”102 Thus, it is not 
much of a leap to anticipate a disproportionate number of instances where Black 
girls are misidentified by facial recognition technology, such as a situation 
where a school is looking at surveillance of a fight or another conduct violation. 
This misidentification could result in disciplinary and negative academic 
 
archive)] (“Critics have said the [Amazon facial recognition] technology could be used to spy on 
minorities, such as undocumented immigrants or African-American activists.”).  
 97. See Tom Loveless, Racial Disparities in School Suspensions, BROOKINGS (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2017/03/24/racial-disparities-in-school-
suspensions/ [https://perma.cc/B2F9-MMXQ] (“Suspensions of African American students occur at 
rates three to four times higher than the state average for all students.”). 
 98. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA TASK FORCE ON REVERSING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 10 
(2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/racial_ethnic_justice/Final%20
School2PrisonPipeline-2nd-012618.pdf [https://perma.cc/T33B-X76H] (“According to the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights, discipline and other disparities are based on race 
and cannot be explained by more frequent or serious misbehavior by minority students.”); School 
Discipline and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://www.adl.org/
education/resources/tools-and-strategies/table-talk/school-to-prison-pipeline [https://perma.cc/JQ52-
2D3L] (“Largely as a result of ‘zero tolerance’ policies that mandate harsh punishments for even minor 
misbehavior in schools, 3.3 million children are suspended or expelled from school each year, about 
double the rate of the 1970s.”). 
 99. Students of color who do not complete high school receive lower salaries than their White 
dropout counterparts. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., WHEN GIRLS DON’T GRADUATE WE ALL FAIL 
8 (2007), https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/when_
girls_dont_graduate.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C7T-9F46]. Students of color are less likely to complete 
high school than White students. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, THE DROPOUT CRISIS: A PUBLIC 
HEALTH PROBLEM AND THE ROLE OF SCHOOL-BASED CARE 2 (Feb. 2018), https://www.apha.org/-
/media/files/pdf/sbhc/dropout_crisis [https://perma.cc/XM77-DEVF]. Individuals who do not attain a 
high school education “are more likely to die prematurely from preventable conditions.” Id. 
 100. Couch, supra note 68. 
 101. Lauren Camera, Black Girls Are Twice As Likely To Be Suspended, in Every State, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (May 9, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2017-05-
09/black-girls-are-twice-as-likely-to-be-suspended-in-every-state [https://perma.cc/7357-95LR]. 
 102. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., LET HER LEARN: STOPPING SCHOOL PUSHOUT FOR GIRLS 
OF COLOR 3 (2017), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/final_nwlc_Gates_
GirlsofColor.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TV4-FYKY]. 
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consequences. If this technology is used to determine who was involved in a 
conduct incident or who is permitted to enter the school, students of color will 
be at risk of being misidentified as individuals who committed conduct 
violations or are otherwise prohibited from entry. 
Research also indicates that facial recognition technology has high rates of 
inaccurate identification of younger faces,103 one of the target populations of 
these scans in schools. There is no information regarding how accurately facial 
recognition technology identifies developing faces. An eighth-grade student 
may look very different at the end of a school year compared to the beginning 
of the year, and teenagers, especially, tend to change their appearances. It is not 
clear whether districts and these machines will be able to keep up.104 Given the 
uncertainty around accurate identification of young people, a threat of negative 
impact on the academic environment remains. All students should feel 
comfortable operating in their academic institutions without experiencing 
embarrassment due to an erroneous identification or fearing interactions with 
law enforcement. 
If a child is misidentified by a machine, surely a human administrator 
should be able to confirm the machine’s read before taking further action, but 
such confirmation may still require that the student be pulled from class for 
questioning. Perhaps after a fight in the hall, a camera identifies student X as 
the culprit and the principal pulls that student from class to address the conduct 
violation, but student X was misidentified. Even if an administrator ultimately 
finds the identification to be inaccurate—perhaps student X was not even at 
school that day—the harm of removing a student from class or making a 
damning allegation against them is already done. What happens when a child’s 
parent is misidentified? The resulting stigma could profoundly impact a young 
person, who may be embarrassed and confused. Bullying in K-12 schools is 
common,105 and a student or parent being questioned or detained could lead to 
bullying, making the academic environment unsafe and unwelcoming for that 
student. Alternatively, fear of misidentification could lead caregivers to avoid 
basic school functions, such as parent-teacher conferences, which may have 
further deleterious effects on a child’s education. These are questions that, as of 
 
 103. Couch, supra note 68. 
 104. Emily Ann Brown, Biometric Security Boosts School Safety and Efficiency, DISTRICT ADMIN. 
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://districtadministration.com/biometric-security-boosts-school-safety-efficiency/ 
[https://perma.cc/CEA2-UWPK] (“Unlike finger scans, students’ faces change as they grow. Creating 
and ‘cleaning’ a database requires more effort, says Sara Collins, policy counsel for the Education 
Privacy Project at the Future of Privacy Forum.”).  
 105. Amy Rock, Bullying Statistics Every K-12 Teacher, Parent and Student Should Know, CAMPUS 
SAFETY MAG. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/safety/bullying-statistics-k-
12/ [https://perma.cc/8D46-83TK] (reporting results from a 2016 National Center for Education 
Statistics study that found that one in five students reported being bullied). 
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now, appear to have no concrete answers but must be addressed before these 
technologies are implemented for surveillance in K-12 environments. 
An example of AI surveillance technology in a K-12 setting is Lockport 
City School District in New York, which contracted with a security company 
to install a high-tech system with facial recognition.106 The district was slammed 
by parents and privacy advocates with concerns that the software would 
misidentify students and negatively affect the school climate.107 The school 
district planned to only upload images of individuals prohibited from entry or 
students flagged for disciplinary issues,108 but the system would still scan every 
child for comparison against the database.109 Further, the video surveillance 
feature would have beefed up school discipline, allowing school officials to 
upload a student photo and then track the student in the video system to 
evaluate a disciplinary incident.110 This harkens back to the concerns regarding 
the likely disproportionate impact on students of color. After paying $1.4 
million, contracting with the security company, and installing the camera 
systems, the school district finally yielded to its critics and updated the school 
security policy to reflect privacy protections.111 The changes include limiting 
access to the database to a few individuals with high security clearances, not 
maintaining any alerts resulting from misidentification in students’ records, and 
providing weekly updates to the Board of Education containing the names of 
individuals added to the database.112 
Given all of the potential harms, schools should be concerned when 
implementing advanced technologies for surveillance purposes. However, they 
may also need to be worried about liability if they do not implement advanced 
surveillance technologies. The proliferation of these technologies leaves open 
questions about school liability under a negligence theory if a school declines to 
implement available technologies. The question remains: If the technology is 
available and school officials do not opt into using it, or misuse it, who is at fault 
if there is a shooting at the school? Due to this potential for liability, schools 
may be further incentivized to employ such technologies. Moreover, given that 
 
 106. Prohaska, Beef Up Security, supra note 23. 
 107. Amy Rock, School Districts Consider Facial Recognition To Improve Security, CAMPUS SAFETY 
MAG. (July 26, 2018), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/safety/school-districts-facial-
recognition/ [https://perma.cc/Z6KG-9FWD]. 
 108. Prohaska, Beef Up Security, supra note 23. 
 109. Mariella Moon, Facial Recognition Is Coming to U.S. Schools, Starting in New York, ENGADGET 
(May 30, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019/05/30/facial-recognition-us-schools-new-york/ 
[https://perma.cc/YE4U-GM3G]. 
 110. Prohaska, Beef Up Security, supra note 23. 
 111. Connor Hoffman, Lockport School Officials Update Security Policies Related to Facial Recognition 
Software, LOCKPORT J. (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.lockportjournal.com/news/local_news/lockport-
school-officials-update-security-policies-related-to-facial-recognition/article_41b1f38b-ad28-508a-
982f-6936641d2307.html [https://perma.cc/6UDT-TV2U]. 
 112. Id. 
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privacy laws are malleable at best, and there is not much in terms of legal 
protection against bias, most of the incentives in this decision tend to encourage 
schools to rush into using technologies without fully considering the risks or 
harms. 
III.  PRIVACY LAWS AND SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE 
There has been little exploration into the privacy implications of advanced 
surveillance technologies in schools. This part provides background on several 
privacy laws that already are, or very likely will be, applied to advanced 
surveillance technologies in schools. It also argues that the appropriate actors 
must clarify how these laws will apply to new technologies in order to inform 
potential consumers about the risks they are facing. When it comes to these 
technologies, the implementing authorities will undoubtedly have to navigate a 
wide variety of laws that protect the privacy of schoolchildren.  
Students are protected—to a certain extent—by the Fourth 
Amendment.113 FERPA governs the protection of student records114 but is 
currently limited in its ability to regulate information obtained from these 
advanced technologies. Furthermore, a handful of states have begun passing 
laws to protect students from biometric information gathering, and these state 
laws are likely the most realistic and efficient path forward to privacy 
protection.115 As Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren predicted in their seminal 
1890 paper The Right to Privacy, “Political, social, and economic changes entail 
the recognition of new rights.”116 Similarly, today’s surveillance state is altering 
society to the point that privacy rights must be extended to children in schools 
who are under the watchful eye of AI and biometrics. 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
1.  The Supreme Court’s Approach to Intangible Searches 
Supreme Court jurisprudence applying the Fourth Amendment to 
emerging technologies is limited but creates a potential framework for 
evaluating AI in schools. Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was 
 
 113. See infra Section III.A. 
 114. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Mar. 1, 2018) 
[hereinafter FERPA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.], https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/
index.html [https://perma.cc/DC2R-HADE]. 
 115. See Andrew Ujifusa, State Lawmakers Ramp Up Attention to Data Privacy, EDUC. WK. (Apr. 
15, 2014) [hereinafter Ujifusa, Ramp Up Attention], https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
2014/04/16/28data.h33.html [https://perma.cc/4QLB-P8B9 (dark archive)] (providing an overview of 
biometric data laws that impact schools in Florida and Kansas); see also discussion infra Section III.B. 
 116. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
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historically limited to a physical conception of privacy invasion and has been 
slow to catch up to technological advancements. In 1928, the Supreme Court 
ruled in Olmstead v. United States117 that the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to wiretapping and that the amendment does not 
apply “unless there has been an official search and seizure of [a] person, or such 
a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical 
invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”118 
However, in his scathing dissent, the forward-thinking Justice Brandeis 
challenged the majority’s hesitance to consider technological advances: 
“[I]n the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only 
of what has been, but of what may be.” . . . Ways may some day be 
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from 
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be 
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. 
Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of 
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can it be that 
the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of 
individual security?119 
It took nearly forty years for the Supreme Court to overturn Olmstead120 
and catch up to rapidly advancing technological progress as Justice Brandeis had 
urged. In 1967, the Court held in Katz v. United States121 that “the reach of [the 
Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical 
intrusion into any given enclosure,” and thus the government’s wiretapping of 
a phone booth “constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”122 The resulting updated framework for determining 
whether something is a search came not from the majority opinion but from 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence.123 This two-pronged “Katz test” asks whether (1) 
 
 117. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 118. Id. at 466 (“We think, therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a 
search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 119. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis’s opinion was much in line with the paper 
he published in 1890. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 116, at 193 (“[T]he term ‘property’ has grown 
to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as tangible.”). 
 120. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“[A]lthough a closely divided Court 
supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material 
object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on 
which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not 
only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard 
without any ‘technical trespass under . . . local property law.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1960))).  
 121. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 122. Id. at 353. 
 123. See id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
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the “person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and 
(2) the “expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”124 The test was quickly adopted by the full Court as the standard 
for assessing Fourth Amendment cases and continues to be used today.125 
Despite this crucial development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
laws regulating intangible surveillance technologies still face uncertainty in the 
courts.126 Most recently, the Court held in a splintered decision in Carpenter v. 
United States127 that the Fourth Amendment protects historical cell-site location 
information (“CSLI”).128 Cell-sites are radio towers that connect a phone to the 
wireless network, and the resulting CSLI is a time-stamped record generated 
from a phone connecting to the wireless network that places an individual near 
that particular cell-site at the times recorded.129 Wireless carriers retain CSLI 
as business records,130 but in Carpenter a court had ordered MetroPCS and 
Sprint to disclose the CSLI of individuals suspected of a robbery.131 The CSLI 
placed the suspect’s phone near the robbery by showing that the phone was 
pinging off of cell-sites surrounding the crime scene at the time of the crime.132 
After the defendant was convicted, the case made its way to the Supreme Court, 
where the defendant argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy to 
his CSLI.133 The Justices took different approaches to the Fourth Amendment 
inquiry, disagreeing about which privacy test to use and whether CSLI should 
be considered protected at all.134 The result of Carpenter did not provide a simple 
 
 124. Id. at 361. 
 125. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (citing Katz in employing a “reasonable 
expectation” of privacy standard, merely one year after the Katz decision); see also Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (“As Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth 
Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society recognizes as reasonable.” (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the 
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim 
a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by 
government action.”).  
 126. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that the installation of a 
GPS device on defendant’s car was a search under the Fourth Amendment); Everett v. State, 186 A.3d 
1224, 1236 (Del. 2018) (holding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when posting photographs on social media). But see United States v. James, No. 18-cr-216, 2018 WL 
6566000, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 26, 2018) (declining to address the issue of whether a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy as to cell tower records that differ from those narrowly addressed in 
Carpenter). 
 127. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 128. Id. at 2221.  
 129. Id. at 2211.  
 130. Id. at 2212. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 2212–13.  
 133. See id.  
 134. See id. at 2219 (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test); id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the property-based test should be applied because property-based concepts 
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test going forward; in fact, the Court specified that its decision was a “narrow 
one.”135 Schools looking to Carpenter to answer questions about what is 
protected under the Fourth Amendment may gain some insights but have no 
assurances about the degree to which it applies to AI surveillance. 
2.  T.L.O.’s Two-Pronged Test for Searches in Schools 
In the context of schools, the extent to which the Fourth Amendment 
protects privacy is a complicated issue. The Fourth Amendment is made 
applicable to public schools through the Fourteenth Amendment136 and, to a 
certain extent, protects students from unreasonable searches and seizures in 
school. In the 1985 landmark case New Jersey v. T.L.O.,137 the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the Fourth Amendment’s “prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials.”138 
After holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to school officials as state 
actors, the Court set forth a relaxed, two-part framework for analyzing searches 
by school officials: the first question asks whether the search was “justified at 
its inception,” and the second asks whether the search was reasonable in scope.139  
The Court explained that “a search [by school officials] will be permissible 
in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives 
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the 
student and the nature of the infraction.”140 The two-pronged test was derived 
from the “reasonable suspicion” standard the Court set forth in Terry v. Ohio.141 
The Court did not require probable cause for searches in schools because it 
concluded that the reasonableness standard would “neither unduly burden the 
efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools nor authorize 
unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren.”142 The T.L.O. 
decision was a turning point in jurisprudence about school discipline because it 
established a Fourth Amendment framework and consequently shifted the 
landscape of school security. 
 
have “long grounded the analytical framework” of Fourth Amendment cases); id. at 2264 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (advocating for a textual-based approach by arguing that the plain language of the Fourth 
Amendment should ultimately determine the outcome of the case). 
 135. Id. at 2220 (majority opinion) (“We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time 
CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell 
site during a particular interval). We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into 
question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.”). 
 136. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985) (holding that the actions of public school 
officials are subject to the limits placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 137. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 138. Id. at 333. 
 139. Id. at 341. 
 140. Id. at 342. 
 141. Id. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
 142. Id. at 342–43. 
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While there have not been many opportunities for courts to grapple with 
the appropriateness and constitutionality of various forms of electronic 
surveillance in schools,143 the relationship between intangible searches, as 
addressed in Katz, and searches in schools, as addressed in T.L.O., came to a 
head as recently as 2008. In the Sixth Circuit case Brannum v. Overton County 
School Board,144 officials at a public middle school installed video cameras 
throughout the school, including in locker rooms.145 A group of students sued, 
arguing that “their constitutionally protected right to privacy encompasses the 
right not to be videotaped while dressing and undressing in school athletic 
locker rooms—a place specifically designated by the school authorities for such 
intimate, personal activity.”146 
With no Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit cases on point, the Brannum 
court utilized the T.L.O. framework.147 In determining that the installation of 
surveillance cameras passed T.L.O.’s justified-at-inception prong, the court 
stated that “the policy of setting up video surveillance equipment throughout 
the school was instituted for the sake of increasing security, which is an 
appropriate and common sense purpose.”148 However, the school crossed the 
line of Fourth Amendment limitations regarding the scope of the search. 
According to the Brannum court, the search was unreasonable in scope because 
“even in locker rooms, students retain ‘a significant privacy interest in their 
unclothed bodies.’”149 While the Sixth Circuit’s ruling may have been 
unsurprising because videotaping minors in various stages of undress seems 
innately wrong, the court’s rationale was not so narrow as to limit the decision’s 
implications to similar situations. The Sixth Circuit instead took a broad 
approach, asserting that “[v]ideo surveillance is inherently intrusive.”150 Under 
this reasoning, regardless of its location or the level of intimacy it may capture, 
video surveillance raises privacy concerns. 
Five years later in G.C. v. Owensboro Public Schools,151 the Sixth Circuit 
again found itself applying the T.L.O. framework and Brannum principles, this 
time to determine whether a school official violated the Fourth Amendment 
 
 143. This is unsurprising given that this is a new issue, the rate at which technology is developing, 
and the Supreme Court’s aversion to questions about technology. See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The 
Supreme Court Is Stubbornly Analog—By Design, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 29, 2018) 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-court-is-stubbornly-analog-by-design/ 
[https://perma.cc/VX6E-LD2C] (“The Supreme Court is an openly—even proudly—technophobic 
institution.”). 
 144. 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 145. Id. at 492. 
 146. Id. at 494. 
 147. Id. at 494–95. 
 148. Id. at 496. 
 149. Id. (quoting Beard v. Whitemore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 150. Id. (emphasis added). 
 151. 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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when she confiscated a student’s cell phone and read his text messages.152 In a 
decision rooted in the T.L.O. two-pronged reasonableness framework, the court 
declined to approve of the search, finding that “using a cell phone on school 
grounds does not automatically trigger an essentially unlimited right enabling 
a school official to search any content stored on the phone that is not related 
either substantively or temporally to the infraction.”153 Here, the Sixth Circuit 
focused primarily on the justified-at-inception prong of the T.L.O. framework 
when finding that “[t]he defendants have failed to demonstrate how anything 
in this sequence of events indicated to them that a search of the phone would 
reveal evidence of criminal activity, impending contravention of additional 
school rules, or potential harm to anyone in the school.”154 G.C. did not involve 
electronic surveillance in the context of cameras, but by searching the phone, 
the school was able to acquire information about the student that they would 
not have been able to obtain without the technology. The court applied Fourth 
Amendment principles in the context of a form of technology that is used with 
increasing frequency, indicating the judiciary’s willingness to apply Fourth 
Amendment principles to modern technology in the school context. It sheds 
light on the ways in which courts are approaching schools’ searches of students 
using technology as a medium.155 
3.  Complexities of Applying the T.L.O. Framework to AI Surveillance 
These cases indicate that courts will likely apply the T.L.O. framework to 
Fourth Amendment challenges to school surveillance programs, but uncertainty 
remains. As Justice Brandeis anticipated in his Olmstead dissent,156 courts and 
lawmakers have been hesitant to take positions on emerging technologies that 
have the potential to implicate privacy.157 If the “inherently intrusive” argument 
from Brannum is widely applied, it could significantly limit the scope of video 
surveillance in schools.158 However, it remains to be seen whether jurisdictions 
beyond the Sixth Circuit will adopt that view; courts have not yet considered 
many cases involving the implication of student rights under the Fourth 
 
 152. Id. at 626, 632.  
 153. Id. at 632–33. 
 154. Id. at 634; see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–2 (1985) (explaining that a search will 
be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will reveal a 
violation of the law or school rules).  
 155. See Know Your Rights: Student Cell Phone Privacy, AM. C.L. UNION N. CAL., 
https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/know-your-rights/student-cell-phone-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/S4DS-WX5L]. 
 156. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 157. See infra Section III.C (presenting an overview of current state laws). 
 158. But see Marriott v. USD 204, Bonner Springs-Edwardsville, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1240 
(D. Kan. 2017) (holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a classroom because it is a 
public place). 
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Amendment and particularly have not addressed questions of school 
surveillance.  
Notably, Brannum and G.C. were wins for student rights, but the T.L.O. 
standard remains a relaxed application of the Fourth Amendment and is thus 
more susceptible to interpretations that weaken protections of student privacy. 
While T.L.O. held that school officials are considered state actors and are 
obligated to act within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment when 
conducting searches in schools, the Court also endorsed the lesser “reasonable 
suspicion” prerequisite for searches conducted by school officials.159 In contrast 
to school officials, police officers generally must have “probable cause” to 
conduct a search or seizure.160 The intersection of T.L.O. and the increase of 
surveillance mechanisms in schools therefore may lead to confusion with respect 
to how these requirements apply to school resource officers,161 who are law 
enforcement officers but work in a capacity similar to school officials.162 In 
People v. Dilworth,163 the Illinois Supreme Court categorized school search cases 
involving the police and found that “most courts have held that the reasonable 
suspicion test” applies where “school officials initiate a search or where police 
involvement is minimal” and in situations “involving school police or liaison 
officers acting on their own authority.”164 However, “where outside police 
officers initiate a search,” courts typically require probable cause.165 Dilworth 
provides a helpful survey of court opinions, but as a state court case, its 
determinations are not binding outside of its limited jurisdiction. 
Since there is no clear answer regarding the Fourth Amendment 
implications of existing security mechanisms in schools, evolving AI systems 
raise even more confusion. The justified-at-inception prong of the search may 
look different in the AI context. For example, it is unclear whether a facial 
recognition camera’s alert to a school administrator that someone on the 
blacklist has entered campus would meet the requirement. Furthermore, the 
biometric scanning of students each time they walk through a different door in 
the school building may reach beyond a “reasonable scope” under the framework 
because scanning children’s faces multiple times per day may be “excessively 
 
 159. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 345; see supra text accompanying notes 141–42. 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. When an officer has only reasonable suspicion, rather than probable 
cause, that an individual is armed, about to commit a crime, or engaged in a crime, the officer may 
“stop and frisk” the individual, which involves a brief detention and a pat-down. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 24–26 (1968). 
 161. Bernard James, Student Searches: Part II: Fine-Tuning the Educator/SRO Relationship, J. SCH. 
SAFETY (2008), https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Student-Searches-JOSS-
Summer-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/62MK-H6SM]. 
 162. Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, 
https://nasro.org/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/GU6J-23V7]. 
 163. 661 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1996). 
 164. Id. at 317. 
 165. Id. 
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intrusive.” Schools and law enforcement may very well be opening themselves 
up to liability under the Fourth Amendment for conducting improper searches. 
Without further guidance from the courts, which likely will not come for a 
while, many of these technologies will likely cause inconsistencies across schools 
in how the T.L.O. framework is applied. 
B. FERPA 
The Fourth Amendment is not the only limiting factor on the potential 
breadth of use of AI surveillance technologies. Congress has also stepped in to 
protect schoolchildren’s privacy. FERPA is a federal law that “protects the 
privacy of student education records” and “gives parents certain rights with 
respect to [those] records.”166 Generally, FERPA prevents schools from sharing 
“personally identifiable information,” which is distinguished from “directory 
information.”167 FERPA may be traditionally viewed as governing disciplinary 
records or specific grades but in most situations includes photos and videos of 
students as part of the protected education record.168 
Despite its ostensible purpose to protect student privacy, there is little 
certainty as to whether or how FERPA protects student data collected through 
forms of AI surveillance. Outside of a plain reading of the student privacy law, 
there are many exceptions to FERPA protection. These include two exceptions 
relevant to the school surveillance context: the “health or safety exception”169 
and the “school officials exception.”170 These exceptions allow schools, in some 
cases, to distort the original intent of the law and disclose information that 
should remain private. 
Two dichotomous problems are often raised in the context of FERPA: (1) 
FERPA is not stringent enough and allows education agencies to disclose too 
much information without consent,171 and (2) FERPA is used as a shield by 
 
 166. FERPA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., supra note 114; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. IV 
2016). 
 167. § 1232g(a)(5)(A), (b)(2) (“[T]he term ‘directory information’ relating to a student includes 
the following: the student’s name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, major field of 
study, participation in officially recognized activities and sports, weight and height of members of 
athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, and the most recent previous 
educational agency or institution attended by the student.”).  
 168. See FAQs on Photos and Videos Under FERPA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/faqs-photos-and-videos-under-ferpa [https://perma.cc/G6YY-
298C]. 
 169. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 170. See infra Section III.B.3. 
 171. Benjamin Herold, Arne Duncan Responds to Criticism Over Student Data Privacy, EDUC. WK. 
(Apr. 15, 2014), https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/DigitalEducation/2014/04/duncan_on_data_
privacy_technol.html [https://perma.cc/QSF9-FN8C (dark archive)] (“Some privacy advocates, 
including Khaliah Barnes, a lawyer for the Washington-based nonprofit Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, argue that FERPA is too outdated and weak to protect children’s information in this era of big 
data and ubiquitous digital devices and tools.”); Jake New, Staying Confidential, INSIDE HIGHER ED. 
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education agencies to hide information they do not want to reveal to the 
public.172 With respect to the second criticism, some groups in recent years have 
criticized schools’ use of FERPA as a shield to cover up wrongdoing and hide 
from bad publicity.173 Even the original sponsor of the law, former Senator 
James L. Buckley, recently called out “a pattern where the universities and 
colleges have used [FERPA] as an excuse for not giving out any information 
they didn’t want to give.”174 When it comes to AI, these issues will only become 
more complex, and, without Congress strengthening FERPA, much of the 
collected information will be at risk of disclosure. 
1.  Development of FERPA 
Congress passed FERPA in 1974 with the intention of protecting 
students.175 The law was originally passed with little discussion, but after public 
backlash, the bill’s sponsors issued a statement “emphasiz[ing] the need for 
parents to have access to the information contained in student education records 
in order to protect their children’s interests.”176 FERPA was subsequently 
amended to explicitly protect the privacy of students’ personally identifiable 
information by “strengthen[ing] the right of students to a hearing to challenge 
the content of records they believe are inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in 
 
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/08/03/privacy-loophole-remains-open-
after-outrage-over-u-oregons-handling-therapy-records [https://perma.cc/P222-RMU2].  
 172. Amye Bensenhaver, Kentucky Universities Continue To Hide Behind FERPA, FORWARD KY. 
(June 12, 2019), https://forwardky.com/kentucky-universities-continue-to-hide-behind-ferpa/ 
[https://perma.cc/QM5L-BZKS]; Frank D. LoMonte, Ferpa Frustrations: It’s Time for Reform, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (May 9, 2010), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Ferpa-Frustrations-Its-
Time/65419 [https://perma.cc/WEF2-6KJU (dark archive)].  
 173. Zach Greenberg, Let Ferpa Be Ferpa, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 14, 2018), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Let-Ferpa-Be-Ferpa/242232 [https://perma.cc/Y9U3-ZT7A (dark 
archive)] (“[FERPA] has been invoked to stifle police investigations into campus crime and cover up 
scandal after scandal concerning college athletics, cronyism in admissions practices, and administrative 
malfeasance.”); Tamar Lewin, Privacy and Press Freedom Collide in University Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/education/21privacy.html [https://perma.cc/TC28-
MAHT (dark archive)] (discussing a legal battle between the University of Illinois and The Chicago 
Tribune over documents related to the university’s longstanding admission of well-connected students: 
“The Tribune, backed by media groups including The New York Times, argues that the documents are 
not education records under the federal law, but rather records of questionable conduct, so the public’s 
right to know should prevail”); George Schroeder, It’s Clear the ‘O’ Stands for Opaque, REGISTER-
GUARD (Feb. 18, 2011), http://special.registerguard.com/csp/cms/sites/web/sports/columnists/
25904339-41/records-public-ncaa-oregon-ferpa.csp [https://perma.cc/6TVQ-LHTQ] (discussing the 
University of Oregon’s denial of a newspaper’s open-records request where one journalism professor 
called the university’s denial “an abuse of FERPA to conceal records of an NCAA investigation into 
possible rules violations by student athletes”). 
 174. Schroeder, supra note 173. 
 175. See 121 CONG. REC. 13,990 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Buckley).  
 176. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. 
[hereinafter FERPA, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO CTR.], https://epic.org/privacy/student/ferpa/ 
[https://perma.cc/VD5L-ARVT]. 
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violation of their privacy or other rights.”177 The law has been amended a 
number of times to account for new issues.178 However, the Department of 
Education weakened FERPA in 2008 through rulemaking in spite of opposition 
by privacy advocates and civil liberties groups.179 The 2008 rule amended 
FERPA regulations to “authorize the disclosure of education records without 
consent to contractors, consultants, volunteers, and other outside parties to 
whom an educational agency or institution has outsourced institutional services 
or functions.”180 
In recent years, there have been demands for the U.S. Department of 
Education to issue guidance to clarify FERPA’s scope and application, and 
some critics have pressured Congress to update the law to meet new security 
and privacy needs created by advanced technology.181 Although the 2008 rule 
received flak for its expansion of record disclosure, it did expand the definition 
of “personally identifiable information” to include biometric data under the 
statute.182 The rule clarified that a student’s biometric record includes 
“fingerprints; retina and iris patterns; voiceprints; DNA sequence; facial 
characteristics; and handwriting.”183 This update was a vital step in protecting 
students from disclosure of personal information obtained through advanced 
 
 177. Id.; see Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, sec. 2(4)(A), § 438(a)(2), 88 Stat. 1855, 1861 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (2012 & Supp. IV 2016)). 
 178. See FERPA, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 176 (listing the nine amendments 
to FERPA since its enactment); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. IV 2016). 
 179. See, e.g., Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., Wash. Legislative Office, Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, & Christopher R. Calabrese, Legislative Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Regina Miles, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May 23, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
ACLU_Comments_on_Changes_to_the_Family_Educational_Rights_and_Privacy_Act_FERPA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G5BC-9LRV] (“This notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) represents a 
significant new privacy invasion.”); ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., COMMENTS OF ELECTRONIC 
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (May 23, 2011), 
https://epic.org/privacy/student/EPIC_FERPA_Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4SX-BKJB] 
(“Expanding third party access to student data is contrary to FERPA, given the purpose of the Act.”). 
 180. Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,806, 74,806 (Dec. 9, 2008) (codified 
as amended at 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1) (2019)). 
 181. See Greenberg, supra note 173; Henry Kronk, Student Data Security Is at Risk. We Need To 
Update FERPA, ELEARNING INSIDE (Nov. 25, 2018), https://news.elearninginside.com/student-data-
security-is-at-risk-we-need-to-update-ferpa/ [https://perma.cc/GQM7-G7FF]; Andrew Ujifusa, School 
Officials Urge Congress to Update Student-Data Privacy Law, EDUC. WK. (May 17, 2018), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-
12/2018/05/school_officials_student_data_privacy_law_congress_urge.html [https://perma.cc/GRY9-
TSMT (dark archive)]; see also Benjamin Herold, Trump School Safety Commission: Time To Update 
FERPA, EDUC. WK. (Dec. 18, 2018), https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/
DigitalEducation/2018/12/school_safety_commission_ferpa.html [https://perma.cc/CVK9-KG7U 
(dark archive)]. 
 182. Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,851 (codified as amended at 34 
C.F.R. § 99.3(d) (2019)). 
 183. Id. 
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technologies. Nonetheless, all personally identifiable information, including 
biometric information, may be disclosed if it falls within a FERPA exception. 
2.  The “Health or Safety Exception” and Surveillance 
As part of its 2008 rule, which was promulgated one year after the mass 
shooting at Virginia Tech,184 the Department of Education clarified when 
typically protected student information may be disclosed for health or safety 
reasons.185 The “health or safety exception,” as it is called, gives schools “greater 
flexibility and deference” to disclose educational records without consent to 
“appropriate parties,” which could include law enforcement or emergency 
responders, among others.186 The exception may be employed in the presence 
of an “actual, impending, or imminent emergency”—including “a campus 
shooting”—and any information released must be related to the emergency.187 
The Department’s recently released School Safety Commission Final 
Report demonstrates that the boundaries of the health and safety exception are 
less than clear; schools remain confused about when FERPA protects safety-
related student information and when that information falls within the 
exception.188 The Department’s report explained that law enforcement officers 
who “[sought] access to school surveillance footage to help ensure school safety” 
were denied access by schools that claimed the footage was protected by 
FERPA.189 The officers in those cases believed that FERPA permitted them to 
access the footage.190 In an attempt to dispel this confusion, the Department 
explained, “If a school’s security department or campus police maintains the 
school’s surveillance video system and, as a result, creates surveillance footage 
for a law enforcement purpose, FERPA would not prevent sharing the 
surveillance footage with local law enforcement.”191 
The report does not clear up all of the confusion surrounding FERPA 
information-sharing permissions as applied to surveillance technologies. The 
Department’s explanation seems to consider all school surveillance footage to 
be for a law enforcement purpose and thus shareable under the exception.192 
Moreover, the report specifies that a school official can be designated “as the 
 
 184. See Hauser & O’Connor, supra note 1. 
 185. Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,854.  
 186. FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 129–30; see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(a) (2019). 
 187. When Is It Permissible To Utilize FERPA’s Health or Safety Emergency Exception for Disclosures?, 
U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/when-it-permissible-utilize-ferpa’s-health-or-
safety-emergency-exception-disclosure [https://perma.cc/VRY2-BRZH].  
 188. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 131. 
 189. Id. at 132. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. 
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school’s law enforcement unit for this purpose.”193 This will allow for the 
exposure of more student information to law enforcement and will make it more 
difficult to determine which individuals may gain access to FERPA-protected 
information and under which exception they may have a claim to that 
information. It seems that this would leave the door open for a school to 
overutilize this exception. 
In 2018, the Department released a Frequently Asked Questions resource 
to clarify how photos and videos are protected under FERPA.194 Arguably, this 
only complicated matters further. The FAQ stated that if responsibility for 
videos falls with the school’s “law enforcement unit,” the videos are not 
education records under FERPA and could be given to the police without 
consent or an exception.195 However, if the videos are education records—which 
they presumably would be if they were not maintained by the school law 
enforcement unit—then there must be written consent, an applicable exception, 
or a judicial order before such records could be given to police.196  
This explanation leaves much to be desired. Without a clearer standard, 
students will not know the extent to which video footage may be shared, 
particularly as it seems schools themselves struggle with understanding the 
rules.197 The FAQ and the resulting confusion also have the potential to lead to 
more student encounters with the police. Student interactions with the police 
should remain as limited as possible in order to maintain the sanctity of the 
educational environment and avoid the variety of long-term negative 
consequences that can result from student encounters with law enforcement. 
3.  The “School Officials Exception” and Discretion 
Another exception, the “school officials exception,” allows “[e]ducational 
agencies and institutions [to] disclose [personally identifiable information] from 
education records without consent to school officials (including School 
Resource Officers), provided they meet the school’s criteria for ‘school officials’ 
with ‘legitimate educational interests.’”198 This exception leaves a significant 
amount of discretion to the schools to determine who qualifies as a “school 
official.” One consequence of the exception is that schools could designate 
School Resource Officers (“SROs”) as school officials, thus creating a backdoor 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Eric Barba, Got a FERPA Request for Video? Consult the April 2018 FPCO Guidance Before 
Responding, CONN. EDUC. L. BLOG (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.connecticuteducationlawblog.com/
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responding/ [https://perma.cc/U5YY-XK8D]; FAQs on Photos and Videos Under FERPA, supra note 168. 
 195. FAQs on Photos and Videos Under FERPA, supra note 168. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 131. 
 198. Id. at 130 (emphasis added); see 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1) (2019). 
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to the health and safety exception, which otherwise grants access to law 
enforcement officers in emergency situations only.  
The Department’s Privacy Technical Assistance Center issued a Q&A in 
February 2019 to shed some light on the relationship between law enforcement, 
SROs, and FERPA, and it revealed just how easily a school can make this 
designation.199 If a law enforcement officer is an employee of the school and 
constitutes a “school official with a legitimate educational interest” according to 
the school’s definition, the officer could then be considered a school official.200 
SROs and off-duty officers could also easily meet the requirements of being 
school officials simply by ensuring school safety, meeting the school’s definition 
of school official, remaining subject to the use and redisclosure requirements of 
FERPA, and having a memorandum of understanding with the school.201 The 
ease with which schools can allow law enforcement to access student 
information, even when it is limited to the purposes of promoting “school safety 
and the physical security of students,”202 is extremely concerning with respect 
to the protection of students’ rights. In addition to the risks associated with law 
enforcement interactions, as discussed in Part II, allowing SROs and other 
officers to act as school officials will further blur the line between police, who 
need probable cause to conduct a search, and school officials, who merely need 
reasonable suspicion. Thus, it will be easier for law enforcement to search 
students and consequently interfere with students’ educational experiences. 
The wide latitude the exception provides to schools to designate school 
officials, and therefore decide who has access to student records, may also create 
 
 199. See PRIVACY TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL RESOURCE 
OFFICERS, SCHOOL LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS, AND THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND 
PRIVACY ACT (FERPA) 14 (Feb. 2019), https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/sites/default/files/
resource_document/file/SRO_FAQs_2-5-19_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y59-EC8L]. 
 200. Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 201. SROs and off-duty officers may 
qualify as “school officials” under FERPA if they: 
1. Perform an institutional service or function for which the school or district would otherwise 
use employees (e.g., to ensure school safety); 
2. Are under the “direct control” of the school or district with respect to the use and 
maintenance of the education records (e.g., through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
that establishes data use restrictions and data protection requirements); 
3. Are subject to FERPA’s use and re-disclosure requirements in 34 CFR § 99.33(a), which 
provides that the PII from education records may be used only for the purposes for which the 
disclosure was made (e.g., to promote school safety and the physical security of students), and 
which limits the re-disclosure of PII from education records; and 
4. Meet the criteria specified in the school or district’s annual notification of FERPA rights 
for being school officials with legitimate educational interests in the education records.  
Id. at 12.  
 202. Id.  
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inconsistent approaches under FERPA from school to school or even over time 
on a single campus, which could further confuse students and parents. While 
schools may have different discipline codes, all public schools are bound by the 
same federal law, so it follows normatively that a student should have the same 
legal protections regardless of which public school they attend. While it is 
important that schools have the autonomy to operate in the way that best meets 
the needs of their specific communities, the amount of discretion left to schools 
under this exception potentially allows schools to push the limits of FERPA 
and act in a way that is contrary to its intent. Students should have clarity as to 
whether their information will be protected and how their school’s policies 
comport with the requirements. School autonomy should not come at the 
expense of student privacy. 
An additional issue regarding the school officials exception is what, 
exactly, falls into the category of a “legitimate educational interest.”203 Schools 
must provide students with their own definitions of what constitutes a 
“legitimate educational interest.”204 The National Forum on Education 
Statistics (“NFES”), a subdivision of the Department of Education’s National 
Center for Education Statistics, issued a guide to help education agencies 
understand their responsibilities to protect student information, including how 
to apply the school officials exception.205 In the section of the guide entitled 
“Defining ‘Legitimate Educational Interests,’” NFES fails to provide any 
precise definition of the term, suggesting only that schools “could make broad 
decisions based on legal requirements and good practices.”206 While the guide 
does include a brief sample policy for schools to use as a model, the NFES guide 
is not official departmental guidance, and thus it is possible that adherence to 
the model would not be sufficient to preclude a school from liability207 for 
wrongly considering a specific situation to constitute a “legitimate educational 
 
 203. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A) (2012 & Sup. IV 2016). A school official generally has a 
legitimate educational interest if the official needs to review an education record in order to fulfill his 
or her professional responsibility. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND 
PRIVACY ACT: GUIDANCE FOR ELIGIBLE STUDENTS 3 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., FERPA GUIDANCE], https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/for-eligible-
students.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U6V-2NEM]. 
 204. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FERPA GUIDANCE, supra note 203, at 3; see 34 C.F.R. 
§ 99.31(a)(1)(i)(A) (2019). 
 205. NAT’L FORUM ON EDUC. STATISTICS, FORUM GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF 
STUDENT INFORMATION, at vii (Mar. 2004), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2004/2004330.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E99P-4BTY]. 
 206. Id. at 51. 
 207. The Department of Education is the FERPA enforcement body and thus oversees 
compliance. An individual may file a complaint with the Department to hold their institution 
accountable. The Supreme Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce FERPA. 
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002).  
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interest.”208 The lack of clarity could open the door to school officials accessing 
sensitive information about students without actual legitimate reasons to do so. 
Further, FERPA permits schools to consider even some third parties to 
be school officials under this exception if the party “[p]erforms an institutional 
service or function” otherwise performed by an employee, is “under the direct 
control” of the school “with respect to the use and maintenance of education 
records,” and is subject to requirements concerning personally identifiable 
information.209 This could be interpreted to include security companies that 
handle a wide range of student data, such as face images, fingerprints, location 
services, and attendance records. Even if third parties are prevented from 
selling data, there are risks of security breaches and violations of agreements. 
The closest the Department of Education has come to addressing this 
third-party issue was in the context of education technology companies, which 
primarily support personalized learning platforms and other educational 
classroom software.210 After one school required a parent to “accept the terms 
and conditions of its third-party online learning platforms in order to enroll her 
child,” the Department found that the school had violated FERPA by 
impermissibly conditioning enrollment on a waiver of “the rights and 
protections accorded under FERPA.”211 This indicates there is some basis in the 
Department’s own precedent for the argument that a school cannot force its 
students to allow biometric information to be uploaded into a system 
maintained by a third party. Nevertheless, the Department has failed to provide 
unequivocal guidance.  
4.  Concerns Regarding Applicability of FERPA to AI Surveillance 
While the health and safety and school officials exceptions could be vital 
for security enhancements, in practice they make FERPA more malleable. 
Although the exceptions may occasionally be critical to prevent violence and 
self-harm, the Department has expanded FERPA to the point that it has opened 
some serious loopholes. Critics believe FERPA has been weakened to the point 
that it is practically useless and merely a protective cover for schools to avoid 
liability.212 For instance, to consider all school surveillance video systems to be 
within the reach of law enforcement is to contradict the very purpose of 
 
 208. See NAT’L FORUM ON EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 205, at 51. 
 209. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(B). 
 210. Lindsey Barrett & Amelia Vance, Dept of Ed: Schools Cannot Require Parents or Students To 
Waive Their FERPA Rights Through Ed Tech Company’s Terms of Service, FERPA SHERPA (Jan. 20, 2018), 
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FERPA. FERPA’s original intent to protect the privacy of student records213 is 
now at risk of being abandoned in the face of technologies that extract mass 
amounts of data from students. 
In its December 2018 Final Report, the Department of Education’s 
Federal Commission on School Safety called on Congress to collaborate in an 
effort to “modernize FERPA to account for changes in technology since its 
enactment” so that more advanced (and potentially more invasive) security 
technologies can be installed in schools for the purpose of reducing violence, 
including shootings.214 Just as the courts have neglected to develop the law in 
keeping up with technological innovation, so has Congress. FERPA needs a 
new face—one that actually protects student privacy and clearly specifies when 
it is appropriate to step outside the confines of the law to prevent harm to 
students and others. 
In fact, if strengthened, FERPA could supplement privacy protections 
beyond what the T.L.O. framework provides. The law could be amended to 
provide for explicit considerations regarding the private nature of information 
obtained through advanced technologies, specifying how the exceptions 
comport with technology and safety needs. There is a difference between 
personally identifiable information in the form of video or fingerprints and 
personally identifiable information in the form of attendance records. The 
former is inherently more personal and has the potential to expose the student 
to more negative consequences if released. Congress must consider and make 
explicit FERPA’s applicability to surveillance data as schools implement AI 
technologies, particularly when the data (e.g., face images and fingerprint scans) 
is being stored in a system owned by an outside company. These systems are of 
heightened concern, particularly if they also surmise students’ feelings, 
behaviors, and activities, as is the case with the “smart eye” technology discussed 
earlier.215 As applied to threat assessment programs, an additional layer of 
concern exists around the safeguarding of data pertaining to students’ mental 
health.216 There is a delicate, complex balance between FERPA as a privacy 
protector and FERPA as a barrier to preventing school shootings. At the very 
least, to avoid compliance violations and liability under FERPA, students and 
guardians should be directly informed about what information AI companies 
are using in the name of security, how and where it is stored, and what is being 
done or could be done with the information.217 
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C. State Laws 
While the federal government has been slow to act, states have taken it 
upon themselves to deal with student safety and security through state 
legislation. In 2018 alone, more than fifty state school safety bills were signed 
into law.218 Since 2013, forty-one states have passed 126 laws that in some way 
address student privacy.219 Many of the privacy laws address testing standards 
and data breach policies,220 and some concern the relationship between student 
data and outside technology vendors.221 However, only a handful of states have 
taken legislative action to limit the collection of biometric data in public 
schools.222 Until the federal government begins to answer these questions, states 
should enact laws to ensure the protection of students’ rights. In fact, a trend of 
state action may lead Congress to make changes. 
1.  Existing State Laws Regarding Biometrics in Schools 
The few states that have acted to protect student biometric data have taken 
different approaches to the issue. In 2014, Florida completely banned223 
biometric data collection in public schools after state lawmakers cited the need 
for student privacy and protection.224 The general sentiment by Florida 
lawmakers was that biometrics should not be used until there is more 
information about how it works and what will happen with the data.225 Florida 
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 219. State Student Privacy Laws, FERPA SHERPA (Aug. 6, 2019), https://ferpasherpa.org/state-
laws/ [https://perma.cc/DM3V-F3N6]. 
 220. Id. (indicating, for example, that Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, 
and Kentucky have laws addressing testing standards and data breaches). 
 221. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584 (West 2017) (preventing K-12 technology service 
providers from disclosing much of the information they acquire); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, 
§ 953 (Westlaw through 1st Spec. Sess. of 129th Leg.) (requiring technology operators to obtain explicit 
consent from parents or eligible students before using student data for a number of enumerated 
purposes); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.272 (LexisNexis 2016) (mandating that schools include 
privacy and security provisions and penalties for noncompliance in contracts with data service 
providers).  
 222. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-109 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.222(1)(a) (West 2016); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6315 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.8(B) (2013).  
 223. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.222(1)(a) (“An agency or institution . . . may not . . . [c]ollect, 
obtain, or retain information on the political affiliation, voting history, religious affiliation, or biometric 
information of a student or a parent or sibling of the student.”). 
 224. Ujifusa, Ramp Up Attention, supra note 115. 
 225. See Ryan Kline, Shedding Light on Florida’s Biometric Ban, SECUREIDNEWS (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/shedding-light-on-floridas-biometric-ban/ 
[https://perma.cc/5T4D-YUAS]. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 438 (2020) 
476 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
state Senator Dorothy Hukill reasoned that “most people have no idea what the 
use of biometric information means, and even those who do understand it 
shouldn’t have the choice to participate—for now.”226 
A handful of states—Illinois,227 Louisiana,228 Kansas,229 and Arizona230—
have passed laws that allow biometric collection in schools, but only if a parent 
or guardian consents. One such law was proposed in Missouri in January 2019 
but has not made any progress.231 Requiring guardians to give consent for 
certain types of information collection is a critical approach to managing 
biometrics in schools because it allows for autonomy and control over personal 
information.232 This notice-and-consent requirement also aligns with the intent 
of FERPA to protect student privacy.233 
2.  State Responses to Biometric Use Generally 
Only three states—Illinois,234 Washington,235 and Texas236—have laws 
that regulate the commercial use of biometric data. In Illinois, the Biometric 
Information Privacy Act “covers biometric information such as thumb prints or 
retinal images but also geometrical data gleaned from a person’s face.”237 The 
Texas law closely resembles Illinois’s law and also includes facial recognition, 
retina scans, and voice identification.238 Meanwhile, Washington’s law broadly 
defines biometric data but excludes specific types of imaging, suggesting that 
the law likely will not have a sufficient impact on the use of facial recognition 
technology.239 San Francisco, however, is considering a ban on facial recognition 
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surveillance as well as audits of existing technologies in use, including ballistic 
detection.240 The city’s lawmakers proposed the ban due to concerns about 
privacy, machine bias, and misuse by law enforcement officials that could lead 
to an oppressive state.241 These laws reflect a growing trend by states and 
municipalities to address privacy concerns surrounding biometric surveillance, 
which could serve as the impetus to expand protections to schools. Legislative 
action in the general surveillance field should inform how school surveillance is 
treated. 
3.  Potential for the Evolution of State Laws 
For some, the appeal of advanced surveillance to reduce violence may be 
sufficient to suppress any concerns about privacy or societal impact. However, 
the move, albeit slow, toward bans or restrictions on collection of biometric data 
suggests a shift in the way the public and state lawmakers are thinking about 
these technologies. There is much left to learn about advanced surveillance 
technologies, but “[a]buse doesn’t happen at the outset[, i]t happens when the 
technology becomes entrenched and dismantling it becomes unimaginable.”242 
Thus, concerns need to be addressed at the beginning of the evolution, before 
it is too late. One school district in Texas, which does not regulate biometrics 
in schools, is already using the technology to track attendance in class and at 
school-sponsored social events and to process library book check-outs.243 In 
Missouri, one school district is using biometric facial recognition cameras to 
identify individuals from law enforcement criminal databases, and the system 
can lock the school down when it identifies such an individual.244 
These technologies are already ingrained in society and becoming 
normalized. One crucial issue is whether students in states without legal 
restrictions are able to opt out of surveillance programs. It is doubtful that 
students are truly given an option not to participate in school programs that 
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store their personal data, particularly when schools require the use of face 
scanners to open doors, geolocation programs to take attendance, or 
fingerprinting to pay for lunch. The development of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence moves slowly,245 and it is unclear how the Supreme Court will 
treat advanced surveillance in schools. FERPA has many vague exceptions and 
loopholes, to the point that it is essentially toothless with respect to many facets 
of this issue.  
As the most significant and efficient movement has been on the state level, 
it appears that state laws have the greatest potential for securing student privacy 
in the face of the growing use of biometrics and AI in schools. In addition to 
states’ abilities to act more quickly than the Supreme Court and Congress, most 
regulation of K-12 schools comes at the state and local level. Thus, states are 
uniquely positioned to tailor their laws to the specific needs of their schools. 
States should ensure that schools are transparent with their students as to the 
types of information obtained, where and how it is stored, and if there is an 
option for students to opt out. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment is not an argument against the implementation of 
lifesaving technologies in K-12 schools; the reality is that the AI surveillance 
technologies discussed in this Comment have not been proven to effectively 
save lives or prevent violence in schools. Furthermore, the black boxes and lack 
of intuition in AI programs, coupled with a lack of accountability by lawmakers 
and the U.S. Department of Education, prevent people from knowing exactly 
how these technologies are making decisions, which only increases the risk of 
pernicious behavior and due process concerns.246 The risks to the academic 
environment and the long-term impacts of machine bias and privacy violations 
are sufficient reasons to pause the rapid acquisition of these technologies. 
Instead of emphasizing prevention and using mental health assessments and 
awareness programs, these technologies only respond to a crisis that already 
exists. 
It is a critical time to discuss the problems, along with the excitement, that 
AI brings. The information available about the impact of AI surveillance in 
schools and how existing privacy laws apply to this type of surveillance is 
limited; students and guardians must have the necessary information and ability 
to make informed decisions. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
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Americans have the right to privacy and that this right extends to schools. It 
should not be so easy to compromise the societal value we have placed on 
individuals’ rights.  
More than anything, this must become an interdisciplinary conversation. 
Engineers should continue to develop AI surveillance technology to be 
maximally effective and accurate. Social scientists should research the impact of 
constant surveillance and potential false signals on children and young people. 
They should work together to eliminate bias in AI as well as determine the 
extent to which technologies like facial recognition work on younger, 
developing faces.247 Lawyers should consider liability and keep elevating the 
conversation around due process concerns. Lawmakers should become more 
educated about the benefits and negative consequences of the technologies. In 
addition, educators, students, and parents should be involved in these 
conversations. There are already efforts to incorporate AI education into K-12 
schools to ensure students have the knowledge necessary either to enter the field 
themselves or at least understand their roles and opinions in a world that is 
watching them. 
At the very least, it is critical that the issues with AI are acknowledged. 
The impact that bias can have on students could be traumatic and long lasting. 
There has simply not been enough research into the potential risks of school 
surveillance technologies. It is the monetization of fear—doing whatever it 
takes to make people feel a little better, even if it does not work and puts 
education and student well-being at risk. 
We are progressively normalizing the use of these technologies. When 
students go to school, they should feel safe. Nonetheless, we cannot turn the 
educational environment into schools of surveillance without doing proper 
reconnaissance first. 
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